This paper attempts to assess how compatible China is with respect to its dollar-based exchange rate regime. Assessment is made in terms of the real convergence criteria suggested by the optimum currency areas (OCA) theory. In light of the endogenous problem in OCA analysis and this view of convergence criteria, the relevant features of China are evaluated against economies implementing rigid dollar standard in practice, namely Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama. Findings suggest that economic conditions in China broadly conform to those prevailing in these economies which maintain strong links to the US dollar.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been intense debate on whether China should succumb to international pressures to revalue its renminbi at a faster rate than its present soft/ crawling peg, or to maintain this regime which has been in place since July 2005. Amongst the most vocal advocates of revaluation is Paul Krugman, who continues to call for appreciation of the renminbi at a much faster rate as an effective mechanism to adjust the US-China external imbalances (the so-called "China-bashing"). His stand is vividly refl ected in the following excerpt from his New York Times column published on June 24, 2010: 1 In the same vein, Zhang, Fung, and Kummer (2006) found that China's real exchange rate appreciation might cause Chinese output in both the primary and manufacturing sectors to increase whilst the outputs of the energy and services sectors decrease, leading to little or no changes in the current account balance. Historically, as Peng, Lee, and Gan (2008) discovered, even when the renminbi was overvalued in 1997-2002, China still experienced a huge trade balance surplus against US. In this connection, Hale and Hale (2008) argue that a growing Chinese trade surplus has actually produced numerous benefi ts for the world economy and in particular American corporations and consumers.
In view of this contention, instead of further disputing the merits of the peg, it may be important to ascertain the suitability of the existing Chinese dollar peg as supported by the economic characteristics of China. To do this, this paper assesses the appropriateness of China's present exchange rate regime, namely a crawling peg against the dollar, by comparing the economic characteristics of China to those of its close peripheries of Hong Kong and Macau, the effective dollar currency board economies since 1983 and 1989 respectively. In addition, since Panama has a more-than-a-century-old history of dollarization, that is, since 1901, the Chinese attributes are also evaluated against the Panama's. 1 Taking the lessons from the 1980s and the1990s Japan experience, sharp appreciation of the renminbi might set off a minor investment boom in the US, where investment expenditures rise from a relatively small base, but a major slump in China's huge investment sector which is currently about 45% of GNP. Overall, investment led expenditures including those from US fi rms in China would fall; contracting the Chinese economy and its imports.
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The dimensions explored are the real convergence criteria related to the optimum currency area (OCA) theory, over a 30-year period of 1980-2009. In some ways, the approach used here does take into account the endogeneity view of convergence criteria popularized by Frankel and Rose (1998) . This is so because though China's currency has been pegged to the dollar, unlike Hong Kong and Macau which maintain strict currency board arrangements, the Chinese authorities have been sterilizing dollar infl ows to maintain their control on the internal monetary base and infl ation.
The fi ndings would be useful for policymakers as they should indicate the feasibility for China to persist with its present crawling peg or perhaps more than that, to move to a stricter currency board system similar to Hong Kong and Macau's, or even a joint dollar-based arrangement with the two peripheral territories. A Greater China monetary union comprising of China, Hong Kong, and Macau could well be a stepping stone toward globalization of renminbi as Hong Kong is already an international fi nancial hub. The issuance of yuan-denominated international bonds in Hong Kong in recent years shows that potentiality.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the OCA dimensions and assesses the dimensions of China with those of the "benchmark" economies. Finally, a discussion and conclusion is provided.
Optimum Currency Area Criteria
The foundations of the OCA theory were laid out by Mundell (1961) , McKinnon (1963) , and Kenen (1969) which outline the criteria under which a country or economic zone can reap signifi cant benefi ts and/or substantially reduce the cost of joining a currency area.
Following Quah and Crowley (2010) , the OCA criteria investigated here are trade openness, business cycle synchronization, real exchange rate variability, infl ation convergence, real interest rate symmetry, export diversifi cation, and labour market fl exibility. Similar measurements of the variables were actually used earlier in Zhang (2001, 2002) . 3 Interestingly, the effi cacy of the criteria was evidenced when Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain were selected as the group which exhibits the least similar OCA features against Germany. These member states are among the most distressed euro area members today.
To assess the appropriateness of China's dollar peg, the characteristics of the Chinese economy are measured against those of the US before the same is done for Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama. If the characteristics of the Chinese economy are more 2 See Wu, Pan, and Wang (2010) and Park (2010) for a discussion on the prospects of globalization of renminbi and its challenges.
3 Zhang (2001 and 2002) , however, did not use an export diversifi cation variable.For recent applications of the framework used in this paper, see Quah (2012a; 2012b; 2012c) ; Quah and Ismail (2012) and Quah and Crowley (2012) .
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conforming than some established benchmarks from the other countries then this operationalization of the OCA theory might indicate feasibility for China to persist with its dollar peg, or perhaps to move further towards stricter arrangement of its currency, or even a joint dollar regime with Hong Kong and Macau.
The data sampled for each variable are constrained by data availability over economies. See Appendix A for data defi nitions and sources.
Trade openness
The OCA theory suggests that countries which trade a great deal with each other are good candidates for monetary integration as the benefi ts in terms of transaction cost savings and exchange rate certainty would be greatly enhanced (McKinnon, 1963) . Accordingly, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) have detected that European Member States which achieved the greatest levels of bilateral trade also experienced the greatest increase in their readiness for monetary unifi cation.
A bilateral trade intensity measure, as used by Zhang (2001, 2002) and Boreiko (2003) is adopted here to measure a country's trade openness with the reference country. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 China Hong Kong Macau Panama Figure 1 shows a chart depicting trade openness with the US for China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama in 1980-2009 The chart also shows that the Chinese trade relation with US has been quite robust despite the recent crisis and could even be potentially larger than that of Hong Kong, Macau, or Panama in the future. 
Business cycle synchronization
When business cycles are substantially synchronized between two countries, the argument for fl exible exchange rates to serve as a shock absorber to resolve asymmetric recessionary or infl ationary pressures becomes largely irrelevant. In light of this, the higher the business cycle synchronization with the US, the stronger the argument for adopting the US monetary policy.
In terms of measurement, it has become popular to implement this OCA criterion according to the synchronicity of business cycles by evaluating the cyclical component of output at business cycle frequencies. In this paper, the method of Gerlach (1988) and Baxter and Stockman (1989) is adopted where cyclical components of annual real GDP series are detrended using Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) fi lter. Since the real GDP index series from the IMF are used in the analysis, the fi ltered series are directly comparable without any further transformations.
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One possible facilitator to diversifi cation in trading partners is their stable exchange rate to the international invoice currency of the US dollar. Moreover, given China's liberalizations and their geographical proximity to the mainland, Hong Kong and Macau have traded more intensively with China, hence reducing their relative reliance on US.
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According to McKinnon (1963) , a relatively open economy will tend to experience more fl uctuations in the general price index which reduces the liquidity functions of money. Also, nominal exchange rate changes in that economy were not likely to be accompanied by signifi cant effects on competitiveness because such changes would lead to rapid and large offsetting changes in domestic wages and prices. In this connection, given the increasingly open and export-led economy of China, pegging the yuan rate to the international dollar appears to be consistent with this argument. For China, its real growth movement is remarkably synchronous with the US's in the mid-1980s to early-1990s and also somewhat so in 2007-08 but is notably unrelated with the US cycle in 1995-2005, the period of fi xed yuan-dollar rate. 6 In another respect, the general rise-and-fall pattern across the countries in recent years can be ascribed to the US subprime crisis.
In light of the above, the Chinese cycle does not appear to be as synchronous with the US cycle as Hong Kong's or Panama's. Even when the change in real growth rate was used (see Appendix B), China's growth pattern is still not signifi cantly associated with that of US.
Real exchange rate volatility
Real exchange rate variability is one indicator of synchronicity of economic forces between countries. The level of a country's need for real exchange rate changes is 6 The relatively stable growth pattern in China in 1995-2005 was likely the result of the exchange rate fi xation which was intended to anchor domestic price level and to stabilize the rate of growth. Figure 2 -Continuation an important determining factor for joining a monetary union because real exchange rate changes are clearly measurable and automatically give the appropriate weights to the economic forces of which they are the result (Vaubel, 1978) . These economic forces pertain to infl ation rates, openness, economy size, prices, wage fl exibility, factor mobility, commodity diversifi cation, goods market integration, and fi scal integration (Tavlas, 1993) . Artis and Zhang (1997) suggested that low real exchange rate volatility might indicate absence of asymmetric shocks and presence of business cycle conformity that may strengthen the case for a currency area. 
Infl ation convergence
The traditional OCA literature originated during the era of 'fi x-price' economics, so introducing infl ation convergence as a criterion could be regarded simply as an appropriate normalization (Artis and Zhang, 2001) . Since similar infl ation rates result from similarities in monetary and fi scal policy stances and economic structure, the cost of joining a currency area is presumably low when infl ation rates are similar across members (Nguyen, 2007) . Convergence in infl ation also refl ects similarity in the degree of trade union aggressiveness and in labour costs between countries, implying lesser need for fl exibility in nominal exchange rates to adjust current account imbalances (Fleming, 1971) . Convergence in infl ation is of course the central theme of the Maastricht Treaty. This criterion is measured by the absolute infl ation differential, where and is the rate of infl ation in country and the US respectively. The absolute value is used since the magnitude is of concern here. The largest divergence from the US infl ation was reported by China in 1993-95 because of extremely high infl ation in China, most likely due to the over-borrowing and -investment by the Chinese local governments in the early 1990s. 7 Clearly, the infl ation differential of China began to fall in 1995 8 , following the onset of the 1995-2005 dollar peg to extremely low levels until the Asian crisis and has somewhat levelled off at 2-4% during the 2000s. Indeed, the Chinese infl ation rate after the Asian crisis is at least as convergent with the US level as those of Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama. This could be primarily attributed to the sterilization of money infl ows implemented by the Chinese monetary authorities in their attempt to control the domestic monetary base and hence the infl ation rate.
Real interest rate synchronization
Though not listed as one of the criteria based on the traditional OCA theory (Tavlas, 1993) , this factor is indicated by a 'revealed preference' argument (Artis and Zhang, 2001) . If the monetary policy of a candidate country historically has differed little from that of the reference country, the cost of relinquishing monetary independence should be accordingly low, so that synchronization in real interest rates may be interpreted as an indicator of coordination in monetary policy. 7 See Fan Gang's commentary at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fan16/English (Accessed June 28, 2010) for a discussion on China's pro-active economic policies.
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In 1994 the consolidated offi cial exchange rate was set at RMB8.7/USD. Though this represented a substantial devaluation of the offi cial rate from RMB5.8/USD, the nominal depreciation of the offi cial rate was about the same order of magnitude of the excess of China's infl ation over that prevailing in the US (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2009 ). Hence, real depreciation if any was minimal and as a result trade relations with US were not adversely impacted as can be seen in the rising Sino-US trade intensity discussed earlier. The more synchronous the real interest rate cycle to that of the US, the more coordinated the monetary policy. For comparability over countries, lending rate and CPI infl ation rate are used and detrended series are normalized. Following Zhang (2001, 2002) , detrending is accomplished by applying the H-P fi lter as in the synchronization in the business cycle criterion. Figure 5 compares each of the countries' real interest rate cycles with the US cycle in 1987-2009. For most of the period, the movement of the Chinese rate has been fairly different from the US one in direction or magnitude or both. Whilst in recent years the direction of the rate movement in China had been comparatively parallel with the American, its magnitude was somehow smaller. For the other economies, quite the opposite, as their cycles seem to have noticeably synchronized with the US cycle in both direction and magnitude in the same period. This is not unexpected since the Chinese monetary authorities have been sterilizing infl ows of dollars to pursue monetary policy goals which cater to its national needs in the past two decades. In another respect, as shown by the charts, there seems to be a common movement of real lending rates in recent years across all economies. One possible explanation is the transmission of nominal interest rate changes through the US capital markets and the Fed's policy responses after the housing market bust whilst at the same time infl ation rates in these economies have fallen or not changed much amidst the global downturn in growth.
Export diversifi cation
For a diversifi ed economy, even if its export sector is subject to shocks, if the shocks are independent and the country produces a suffi ciently large variety of different goods, the law of large numbers will come into play and total production will not suffer much (Kenen, 1969) . Accordingly, Dreyer (1978) evidenced that high export diversifi cation is associated with policies to limit exchange rate fl exibility whilst Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1992) found that countries with well diversifi ed exports have adopted more rigid exchange rate arrangements. In this paper, as in Nguyen (2007) the degree of export diversifi cation is measured by the inverse of the period average of the annual Herfi ndahl index, a popular indicator of the degree of specialization. The Herfi ndahl index is computed as where is share of the export of product i, and is the number of products exported. Since data of individual export products are unavailable, annual export data according to the fi rstdigit sub-industries of the United Nation's Standard International Trade Classifi cation (SITC) Revision 2 are used, as shown in Table 1 . 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 China Hong Kong Macau Panama
The 1981-2009 diversifi cation indexes are presented in Figure 6 . One can see that since mid-1980s, the Chinese exports have been less diversifi ed or more specialized, refl ecting the focus towards exports of manufactured goods and the benefi ts from economies of scale as openness to trade rises. The chart also shows that for 1991-1997 the Chinese index converges towards the levels of Hong Kong and Panama before staying quite in parallel with the HK level until 2005. In 2006-08, the Chinese diversifi cation levels were once again greater than the others before being overtaken by Hong Kong and Macau in 2009. The recent rise in diversifi cation in Hong Kong and Macau could have been a reaction to falling income from certain specifi c export sectors.
To summarize, by and large, in relative terms the Chinese exports can be regarded to be at least as diversifi ed as those of Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama.
Labour market fl exibility
Ingram (1962) and Kenen (1969) suggested that domestic labour market fl exibility is equally important to transnational labour mobility (propounded by Mundell, 1961) to maintain employment in the face of shocks. Thus, for any economy the higher the fl exibility of the labour market, the greater the ability to recover from any asymmetric shocks which lead to unemployment, and thus the greater the feasibility of entering a monetary union. One measure of the rigidity of labour markets that has been used in the literature Zhang, 2001, 2002 ) is a ranking measure of the severity of employment protection legislation (EPL). In the same vein, an equivalent measure, the average of the indexes indicating rigidity by Doing Business Project (Table 2) by the World Bank, is used to measure labour market fl exibility. The lower the index, the greater the degree of fl exibility (see Botero et al., 2003) . Besides this measure, akin to Ngiam and Yuen (2001) , unemployment rate can also be used as an indicator to refl ect fl exibility in the domestic labour market where lower rates might indicate greater fl exibility. 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 China Hong Kong Macau Panama largest degree of labour fl exibility, followed by China and Panama. Figure 8 plots the unemployment rates for 1985-2009, where available. Despite exhibiting a steady rise over the years, for most of the time unemployment rate (data are for urban areas) in China has been lower than the rest.
To our economic knowledge, labour market in China would be expected to deliver greater labour market rigidity and unemployment than elsewhere given the remnants of a centrally planned economy in much of the country, so the lower unemployment rates in China are likely due to the exceptional growth achieved in urban areas over this period. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that labour market in China is more fl exible than Panama's. 
Discussion and Conclusion
The preceding discussion attempted to evaluate the appropriateness of China for a dollar peg in terms of the OCA-related criteria using Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama as potential benchmarks. Direct comparisons with Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama, economies with effective fi xed dollar rates, to some extent might mitigate the endogeneity problem of the OCA approach. At the same time this approach might also signify the prospects for a joint dollar regime among the Chinese economies. Based on the measures, the following fi ndings can be drawn.
With respect to trade openness, China has traded more intensely with US than Hong Kong has, and there is potential for the Sino-US trade relation to be greater than that of Macau or Panama. In terms of business cycle symmetry, the Chinese cycle does not appear to be as synchronous with the US cycle as that of Hong Kong or Panama. Regarding real exchange rate stability, the stability level of the Chinese yuan resembles that of Hong Kong. In connection to infl ation convergence with US, after the Asian crisis the infl ation in China has been at least as convergent as those in Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama. Concerning real interest rate cycle synchronicity which approximates monetary policy symmetry, China has not shown relatively substantial level of symmetry with US. With regard to the variety of goods exported, the diversifi cation levels of Chinese exports are at least as high as those of Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama. With respect to labour market fl exibility, the labour market in China is probably more fl exible than that of Panama.
Of all the "indicators" explored, except for business cycle symmetry and interest rate cycle symmetry, the rest of China's features appear to be fairly consistent with a fi xed dollar peg, or at least not contrarian to a dollar regime when compared to our chosen benchmarks. Recall that the benchmarks with "hard" pegs too are not consistently in high degree of conformity with the criteria, what's more with China whose policies employ only a "soft" dollar peg. In addition, despite the divergences in economic objectives and level of economic development between China and US, there appears to be substantial conformity in terms of the dimensions explored on the Chinese side.
In conclusion, the fi ndings appear to broadly support the prevailing dollar peg in China and it might be appropriate for China to at least maintain its present arrangement if not graduating towards a stricter dollar standard such as that established in Hong Kong, Macau, or Panama. This fi nding corroborates McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) who favour a stable yuan-dollar rate for the sake of regional stability and global economic growth. In addition to that, since no severe divergences are found between China, Hong Kong, and Macau, given strong political impetus which is highly possible amongst these Chinese states, a joint dollar-based bloc among them seems viable. This is in line with Zhang and Sato (2008) who detected a rising structural symmetry between the Greater China economies.
Nevertheless, the inferences found here are limited in the sense that economically Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama are much smaller and structurally different from China and hence the usefulness of the criteria might differ between them. But then again, the fact that Hong Kong and Macau are peripheral territories of China and do share many similarities with the mainland in social, political, and economic terms might make Hong Kong and Macau a plausible point of reference for China. This paper is also limited in the sense that it focuses only on economic dimensions but not political aspects, such as "loss of sovereignty" if China were to progress into a rigid regime which entails "kowtowing" to American monetary policies. To assess the relationship between US growth and those in Asia, Kwan (2001) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) regressed the real growth rates of Asian countries on that of the US. To overcome the problems caused by non-stationarity, we regress the yearly change in the real growth rates of China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Panama, respectively (y j ) on that of the US (y US ). 12 Similar to those of the previous authors, lagged regressors are not used since they did not yield signifi cant results. The model is described by equation (1). 2. All Jarque-Bera statistics are not signifi cant, hence assumption of normality of residuals is not violated.
APPENDIX A
3. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test indicates no correlation between residual and regressor for all models.
12 As done by previous authors, we used yearly data because quarterly data on real GDP are not available for most cases for the whole observation period. Data series were checked to ensure stationarity. Based on Ljung-Box Q-statistic of up to 12 lags and Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (selection of number of lags based on Schwartz Information Criterion with maximum lags of 6), the change in real growth rates is stationary and hence used for all economies.
